Disputes about how to show Justice’s “face” and about Law’s “sight” reflect the analytic challenges that have engaged philosophers from John Locke to John Rawls, as they parsed the relationships among sensory perceptions, intuition, evidentiary truths, and cognition. The question of sight has also been engaged by leaders of justice systems acknowledging histories of exclusion and unfair subordination based on the gender, race, ethnicity, and class of disputants.”
Inconographical Conventions, Pictorial Puzzles, and Justice’s Blindfold
- Commitments to Representation
- Impossible to Depict: An Exchange between Mantegna and Momus
- Creating the Canonical Elements
- Sight, Knowledge, and Impartiality
- “Suppose a Man born blind … be made to see”: Locke, Diderot, and Molyneux’s Problem
- Rawlsian Veiling
- Ambiguity and Self-Help: Joshua Reynold’s Justice in Oxford and Diana Moore’s Justice in New Hampshire
Constitutional Metaphors and Injustices
- Color-Blind
- Impartial or Unjust? The “Festering Sores” behind the Blindfold in Langston Hughes’s Justice
- Confrontation, Eyewitnesses, Prison Garb, Spectator’s Badges, and Ostrich Imagery